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To clarify: in this chapter I will speak only of compulsory science education in 
schools; much of what I say will not transfer across to either science electives in 
schools or to undergraduate science. 
 
Such science education, like all compulsory education, is an exercise in force against 
students. Overriding individual autonomy in this way is not to be lightly done and 
should involve appeal to aims that are of sufficient importance for the individual, or 
the group/society, to outweigh such loss of freedom over one's own mind's contents. 
Moreover, the loss of freedom is guaranteed; in order to outweigh it, the benefits 
aimed at should not just be of sufficient moral importance but be attainable with 
sufficient probability for a suffient proportion of students. Finally, to justify the 
imposition of science education requires not just the probable achievement of ends 
that are of sufficient importance to outweigh the loss of freedom that is their cost but 
the absence of better candidates that might occupy the same "time-slot" of lost 
freedom. 
 
All very vague, admittedly, and it is the burden of this chapter to examine this issue in 
further detail as an exercise in sustained argumentation.  My contention will be that 
such argumentation in justification of compulsory science education cannot be 
satisfactorily advanced at the moment and, in any event, does not seem to have been 
yet advanced in the extant literature.  Accordingly, as compulsory school science 
education is without a satisfactory available warrant, it should be excised pending the 





From at least the time of the Sputnik scare, the state of science education has been a 
topic of concern and controversy in Western nations.  Familiar to readers will be the 
flurry of reports and reforms concerning such education.  I have no intention of 
rehearsing the detail of this here1.  I will make one observation, however.  Much, not 
all, of the discussion takes for granted that it is a good thing for school students to 
have a substantial introduction to the ideas and processes of science and then proceeds 
to fuss about how that might most effectively occur.  In effect, in the terms of this 
chapter, this is to assume as satisfactory some set of aims for science education and 
devote one's intellectual energies to the task of judging how to achieve those aims.  
Less attention seems to have been focused upon what those aims should be and even 
less upon a thoroughgoing exercise in justification of those aims.  And, even 
                                                 
1 Michael Matthews gives good overviews in his introduction to William McComas's edited anthology 
and in a monograph of his own (see Matthews, 2000 and Chapter 3 of his 1994, respectively). 
assuming those aims, the literature seems in adequate in thoroughly justifying 
curricular proposals as means to their achievement.  The focus of this chapter is upon 
those latter tasks as aspects of addressing the question: 'what would justify 
compulsory school science education?'.  My judgement is pessimistic as to the 
chances of such a justification being available or, at least, being available for anything 
that very much resembles the sorts of curricula common in schools. 
 
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND THE ONUS ARGUMENT 
 
In a recent paper (Davson-Galle, 2006) I recanted from earlier works (Davson-Galle, 
1994, 2002, 2004a) of mine in which I had advocated greater presence of philosophy 
of science in school science education.  In that recantation, I persuaded myself that no 
good case could be made out for having philosophy of science (in any of a range of 
versions that I examined) as part of a compulsory curriculum in schools.  At the end 
of that paper, I observed that the broad architecture of the paper's argumentation 
'would seem to apply to other parts of the compulsory curriculum, including much of 
science' (p.32 of online listing) but that exploring such matters was not my concern in 
that paper.  This chapter does have such exploration as its concern.  The broad 
argumentative strategy of the chapter is identical to that earlier paper.  The only 
difference is that it is directed at the proposal that science be compulsory, not that 
philosophy of science be compulsory.  As before, the chapter rests its case on an onus 
argument.  The portrayal of such a general onus argumentative strategy was more 
elaborate in that paper than I will reproduce here and for further details I simply refer 
readers to that paper2.  
 
The key assumption of the onus argument which I will follow is that it is a good thing, 
in and of itself, for people to be able to think what they wish to and to act as they 
please.  This is not to champion personal autonomy no matter what.  Rather, it is to 
say that if one is to advocate stopping someone from acting or thinking as they please, 
then the onus is on such a would-be autonomy suppressor to come up with some good 
enough reason for that.  Such an argument would generally3 involve establishing that 
some sort of benefit would ensue as a result of the type and extent of autonomy 
reduction involved and, moreover, enough such benefit to outweigh the autonomy 
loss that is its cost.  Unless such a case can be made out, the "default" position of 
allowing someone to exercise autonomy is operative. 
 
Note the "logical geography" of such an onus argument.  It is not for me to argue that 
autonomy is a good thing.  I take it as an assumption that, other things being equal, it 
is. (I also take it that granting this assumed moral status to autonomy is not wildly 
morally idiosyncratic of me.) It is for the other party to argue that sometimes other 
things are not equal and outweigh autonomy; that is, to argue that, on these matters, 
for these reasons, autonomy should be suppressed.  I am taking the exercise of 
autonomy to be some sort of prima facie right of a fundamental sort, a "good" in itself 
that doesn't need warranting by appeal to some further moral principle.  It might be 
outweighed in importance by some higher good and such a higher good's attainment 
might demand autonomy-suppression but that has to be established in order to 
discharge the onus.  I am willing to allow that there are all sorts of good reasons for 
                                                 
2 See the section entitled: 'Individual Autonomy and General Grounds for Its Denial'. 
3 I say 'generally' because there is one other possibility, as will be elaborated upon below - that of an 
agent retrospectively approving of what had earlier been forced upon her. 
restricting a person's autonomy and sometimes reasons for restricting it in a 
temporally sustained way (prison, for example).  My point is simply that those 
reasons have to be advanced and be satisfactory. 
 
Turning to education, I take the institution of schooling to indeed be a sustained 
exercise in autonomy suppression.  I take it as obvious and general knowledge that 
most students would not voluntarily choose to be at school studying the subjects 
impose and for the length of time that they have them imposed upon them.  Generally, 
then, schooling is an exercise in force.  Can such compulsion be warranted?  If not, 
then the onus is not discharged and student autonomy should be restored.  Schooling 
is, of course, made up of various subjects and activities and it might well be that some 
of these are more able to be warranted than others.  In this chapter, my focus is 
limited to science and, broadly put, the issue is if such an onus can be discharged - 
can forcing scientific knowledge, skills etc upon students who wouldn't choose to 
have them be justified? 
 
Of course it is but autonomy reduction.  It is not as if compulsory science education 
constitutes total enslavement of mind and action.  However, nor is such force to be 
treated as a trifling concern.  The point of the onus argument is that any interference 
with an individual's autonomy requires warranting.  An appreciation of this point is 
reasonably easily gained.  I surmise that few adults would countenance being told that 
they had to lose control over however many hours school science curricula involve to 
learn things that they do not wish to learn.  Saying that it was only a partial loss of 
autonomy so what was the fuss all about would be, I surmise, inadequate mollification 
of their outrage.  At the very least, such an adult would rightfully demand to know 
why, to know what was supposed to justify her loss of control over a part of her life - 
ditto for students.  Indeed, it is instructive to keep in the back of one's mind, when 
considering the putative warrants considered below, if they would be satisfactory 
warrants for forcing adults in relevantly similar circumstances to think and act as they 
would not choose to. 
 
How, then, might such an onus be discharged in the case of compulsory school 
science education? 
 
POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATORY STRATEGIES IN DISCHARGE OF THE ONUS 
 
There seem to be four broad sorts of putative warranting strategies that one might 
advance for such autonomy reduction: 
 
1.  the future adult that the student will become would retrospectively endorse such 
loss of freedom in order to satisfy some curricular aim or other; 
2.  such autonomy reduction is for the benefit of the individual; 
3.  such autonomy reduction is for the benefit of the group; or 
4.  some combination of the above. 
 
In what follows, I methodically work through a number of possible candidate aims as 
warrants for compulsory school science education (hereinafter mostly just 'science 
education' for short).  Some will be standard fare, some not so much.  For each, the 
issue will be if such an aim, to the extent to which it seems plausible to believe that it 
can be achieved by some curriculum, is of sufficient importance to outweigh the loss 
of individual freedom involved.  Of course, in doing this, I will be making moral 
judgements as to the relative importance of some aim's level of achievement versus 
the loss of autonomy that is its cost and others might order their priorities differently.  
My supposition is that my deliberations won't be wildly morally idiosyncratic and will 
at least count as "food for thought" for other moral agents interested in addressing 
these issues. 
 
Note the italicised words above.  Crucial to my case will be the suggestion that it is 
not so much the worthiness of an aim, in and of itself, that is to be put against student 
loss of freedom, it is the plausible extent to which it would be achieved in students.  
That, say, peace on Earth for all time would be sufficiently meritorious to outweigh 
school students' loss of freedom hardly counts as an aim that warrants science 
education if students' participation in the science education curriculum in question 
simply doesn't have the desired consequence to any significant extent.  (I don't, 
obviously, suggest that anyone has tried to warrant compulsory school science 
education in this particular way; it is simply an illustration of the point that, however 
noble the end is, it doesn't warrant a means unless the means actually achieves the end 
- and achieves it to what is deemed to be a satisfactory extent). 
 
Note also that not all of the possible content that might constitute a science education 
curriculum will necessarily fare equally well as means to the achievement of various 
candidate ends, or aimed at results.  The above point about the achievability of aims 
being an important element in their chances of warranting a compulsory curriculum 
will likely be nuanced by such curricular detail.  Note that this fine structure is not 
just a matter of biology versus physics versus geology, or integrated science studies 
versus discipline-based subjects, or science content versus science process, or even, 
with a gesture at recent enthusiasm for various constructivist theories, passive 
transmission of received knowledge versus active construction of one's own 
"knowledge" (a misnomer in my view).  Within any of these there are variations as to 
the quantity of material covered (the size of the curriculum, if you like) and the level 
of generality/specificity that one might go into. 
 
Finally, students vary and it is possible that what one might be able to warrant forcing 
on some students, one cannot warrant forcing on others.  One issue here would again 
be the extent to which a particular aim was able to be achieved.  Johnny might gain 
much from his school science education in terms of fulfilling some aimed-at end, 
whilst Janie might not. 
 
As will be readily appreciated, the above spread of intersecting variables forms a 
multi-dimensional matrix with quite a lot of cells.  As this is a book chapter and not a 
book in its own right, I will clearly not be able to address each possibility in fine 
detail.  Fortunately, groupings of possibilities seem to share enough features to be 
able to be profitably considered together.  Despite this, my treatment is, perforce, 
embryonic, although, in my view, a useful starting framework for further work. 
 
A recurring theme in what follows is that, generally speaking, there seems to be a 
problem in finding realistic aims, ones plausibly achievable to an extent that would 
warrant freedom loss on the part of all students.  I allow that that sort of judgement 
rests upon empirical propositions (that this means doesn't achieve that end to such and 
such an extent).  Although not my field (I am a philosopher, not a social scientist of 
any sort) what I have accessed of the science education literature seems rather thin to 
the point of transparency when it comes to longitudinal studies linking science 
curricula of various sorts with the achievement of various candidate aims - especially 
if those aims refer to situations later down the track concerning the adult citizens that 
the students become.  Of necessity, my conclusions rest more upon assumptions than I 
would like, although I do take the assumptions to be plausible ones.  If I am correct 
about the paucity of empirical research on these matters, then I do not see this as a 
problem with my argumentation.  The whole point of the (above outlined) onus 
argumentative strategy of the chapter is that the burden of proof is not upon me but 
upon those who would impose science curricula.  It is for them to establish that those 
curricula perform as advertised by reference to aims which (were they to be achieved 
to a satisfactory extent) would warrant the freedom loss that is their cost.  No news is 
bad news for such theorists, not for me.  That said, there may well be studies that have 
escaped my attention and that possibility is a potential weakness in the empirical 
premises that my arguments (to the effect that the onus obligation has not been 
satisfactorily discharged) rest upon.  As things stand, I will, to an uncomfortable 
extent, rely on common sense plausibility appraisals of the truth of most of my 
empirical claims.  Despite this potential weakness, what I assert does seem to me to 
be plausible and, if I am wrong, then I would be delighted to have that shown by 
reference to competent empirical research. 
 
So, even if making a series of what I will suggest to be unsubstantiated and dubious 
empirical claims, what might an argument attempting to discharge the onus and 
warrant science education look like?  I suggest that all such arguments would be 
variations on the following schema: 
 
MP1 having aim X satisfied in an individual to extent Y would be of sufficient benefit 
to the individual and/or the group to outweigh the loss of autonomy involved for that 
individual in achieving that aim to that extent 
 
DP1 having compulsory science education of sort A would achieve aim X to extent Y  
 
DP2 no other expenditure of the same resources would achieve aim X to an equal or 
greater extent than Y 
 
M/DP1 no other aim beneficial to the individual and/or the group that is in rivalry to 
having aim X satisfied to extent Y is able to be satisfied to an extent that brings equal 
or greater benefit to the individual and/or the group than aim X being satisfied to 
extent Y 
So, 
MC1 there should be a compulsory science curriculum of sort A 
 
A few words of clarification are probably in order as, although familiar to analytic 
philosophers, laying cases out like this as formal arguments seems, from the literature 
that I have read, to be an unfamiliar business within science education circles. 
 
Note that the idea is that every proposition before the word 'so', when conjoined, form 
a set of premises whose role is to entail the argument's conclusion.  For this to occur, 
things commonly left as "hidden assumptions" in less rigorously portrayed arguments 
become explicitly listed.  The merit of this is that all of the elements constitutive of 
the case in question for the conclusion are explicitly laid out for critical scrutiny.  My 
contention will be that all of the usual attempted justifications for forced science 
education have a weak spot somewhere (commonly the version in question's DP 1).  
That any particular argument for a given conclusion has a flawed premise (or 
premises), and thus fails in establishing its conclusion, does not automatically count 
against the conclusion being satisfactory.  It just means that such a conclusion can't be 
warranted in the proposed manner.  That this is so doesn't at all count against the 
chances of some other, independent, argument for the same conclusion faring better.  
(Thus I will be examining independently on their merits a number of putative 
warrants for forced science education.) Mind you, if the standardly advanced warrants 
for some course of action fail and nothing more promising looms on the horizon, one 
would be beginning to view the course of action in question (in our case, forced 
school science education) as literally indefensible. 
 
Looking at this schema, note that the supporting premises are of two distinct sorts.  
Some are labelled as MPs and some as DPs.  The 'M' stands for 'moral' - these 
premises express some sort of moral or ethical stance that the author endorses.  The 
'D' stands for 'descriptive' - these premises express the author's claims about what is 
some sort of factual truth (commonly causal connection claims, as is the case here).  I 
also have M/DP1 which has aspects of both propositional types.  Ideally, this would 
be dis-aggregated into those aspects as separate premises but I have judged it to be 
clearer in this context to leave things as they are. 
 
So, one form of challenge to any argument putatively warranting its conclusion is to 
dispute some premise upon which the case rests.  This might involve disagreeing with 
the author about what is right or wrong, good or bad - in short, entering into a moral 
dispute with the author about the merits of some MP.  Then again, it might involve 
challenging some descriptive premise by suggesting that the author has not got his 
facts straight or, perhaps, that there is no reason to believe that he has.  Or one might 
find fault with instances of each type of premise.  In what follows in considering 
various putative justifications, I will be advancing each sort of complaint. 
 
SOME POSSIBLE AIMS OF SCIENCE EDUCATION OFFERED IN DISCHARGE 
OF THE ONUS 
 
The key moral motivation is provided by MP1.  Although, as we will see below, each 
of the other premises can be vulnerable, I will initially focus on that premise.  So, 
what might be advanced as benefits that outweigh the loss of autonomy that is their 
cost?  In effect, what is to be filled in as X, an aim that is sufficiently worth achieving 
that it seems worth autonomy loss (if achieved to a certain extent)?  I suggest the 
following as a fairly comprehensive list of what emerges in discussions of the aims of 
science education.  Some of the following have official imprimaturs, some do not.  
All seem worth consideration regardless of their status as currently fashionable or not, 
especially given the difficulty that will emerge below in having any warrant succeed.  
Note that it is not as if each is necessarily a "stand-alone" candidate aim; it might well 
be that combinations of aims form a package of benefits that is more successful in 
warranting autonomy loss than its component parts considered severally.  Finally, 
note that, in the discussion of the following, reference will be made back to the four 
broad strategies for warranting any overriding of someone's exercise of autonomy that 
were outlined earlier. 
 
So, one might attempt to support compulsory science education by appeal to a 
schooling aim that as many students as possible should: 
1) be prepared for the workforce; 
2) contribute to the nation's economic wealth; 
3) be able to cope in an increasingly technologically and scientifically sophisticated 
world; 
4) understand the workings of the world around them as part of a "liberal education"; 
5) be prepared to successfully pursue their own life goals; and/or 
6) be prepared to be able to fulfil the role of citizen. 
 
In each case, apart from any general agreement that it is "a good thing" for people to 
have these qualities, the key thing that makes these candidate aims for compulsory 
school science is presumably the view that (severally, or in combination) they could 
act as warrants for some variation on the spread of science curricula currently enacted 
or proposed.  But, for such warrants to work as warrants, as ends justifying some 
science curricular type as means, the latter would have to work in achieving the end 
and, moreover, work to an extent sufficient to warrant the loss of student autonomy 
that it entails.  Moreover, any such warrant is always one that can only be adequate if 
there is no other course of conduct which is a rival for the same (or a lesser) amount 
of autonomy suppression yet is more beneficial in some way than the current 
proposals.  Such benefit might not necessarily be by reference to the same putatively 
good ends that are appealed to by science curricula.  Curricular warrants are always 
relative.  It is not just that something is to be good enough to be worth autonomy 
reduction, it has to be more worth it than rival possibilities or else that particular 
substitute for autonomy won't be warranted.  I rehearse such familiar points from the 
theory of practical reason just to remind us that it is not as if discussions of aims of 
particular disciplinary curricula are events insulated from consideration of other 
curricular possibilities.  (My impression is that, for rather too much of the time, issues 
to do with possible science curricula are indeed considered in an overly insular way.) 
 
However, in most of what follows, I will put such complications to one side as the 
broad thrust of what I will suggest is that, regardless of any claims of its rivals to 
warrant autonomy reduction and to warrant it more robustly than any variation of 
science education, the latter simply fails anyway.  The concern is not so much that 
other things are better, it is that, regardless of their merits, science education might 
not be good enough to even get on a "shortlist" for prioritisation as it seems to achieve 
nothing worthy enough to warrant the loss of autonomy involved. 
 
I will first consider the candidate warranting aims individually and then talk about 
their possible combination.  As touched on earlier, in each case, the general nature of 
the putative benefit that is to outweigh autonomy reduction will involve appeal to one, 
or a combination, of the three sorts of strategy generally available for those who 
would seek to justify stopping anyone doing what they would choose to do.  We met 
these earlier when discussing the onus argument strategy of this chapter.  To use as an 
illustrative example the "preparation for employment" aim listed above (one which I 
will discuss in the moment), one would be asserting the following in fleshing out MP1 
in our argument schema.  Either the adult (John) that Johnny will grow into will have 
to be of the view that he is grateful that he was made to study science because look 
how useful it has been for his career or, regardless of what John comes to think, it will 
indeed be of sufficient use in his employment to yield enough benefit to him, or to the 
rest of us, to warrant imposing it on him against his will.  (The above disjunction is 
inclusive and thus these warrants might combine to outweigh his autonomy loss even 





Turning to those candidate aims, the most easily dismissed is any suggestion that 
science education is able to be justified by appeal to the end of having students 
prepared for the workforce.  I have several observations concerning this suggestion. 
 
First, in clarification of the putative warrant, it is not to be taken as being limited to 
preparing students for whatever jobs they might be able to enter immediately upon 
leaving school.  Especially in modern Western societies, students would likely 
proceed to post-school education before entering whatever employment path they 
have in mind.  So the school level preparation might be more like stage one of a 
multi-stage process of preparation for employment. Further, it is no part of the 
suggestion that science education alone would constitute employment preparation.  
Rather, the suggestion would be something like that it was a necessary component of 
a suite of measures that constituted the best such preparation.  What would have to 
established would be it actually having that status. 
 
Even so, the claimed warrant looks silly.  Even in today's world there are simply not 
enough jobs that deploy the knowledge and skills of science to warrant students being 
forced to engage in science education.  That some will go on to become scientists or 
to enter some other profession or trade that directly utilises some science in the 
performance of the job is not a warrant for science education being compulsory 
across-the-board.  Not enough school leavers will have such futures to warrant 
imposition of science upon all.  Moreover, closer thought about the jobs that do utilise 
science makes it quickly obvious that they do not utilise the full breadth of science 
that would be standardly considered constitutive of school science curricula.  For 
instance, an auto-electrician might find some areas of physics useful background and 
contextual knowledge for specialised trade study but not even all areas of physics are 
relevant to such an occupation  - consider astronomy - and certainly many standard 
areas of science curricula, like biology, are totally irrelevant to such a job. 
 
I take the above to be blatantly obvious and put it that if there is an aim of science 
curricula that provides warrant for the autonomy-reducing compulsoriness of such a 
curriculum, then it will lie elsewhere.  As it stands, one would be replying to a student 
challenge: 'why do I have to do this when I don't want to?' with 'you all have to do all 
of this because some of you will find bits of it it useful in your later employment'.  I 
judge this to be a very unsatisfactory reply indeed and to not constitute a satisfactory 
warranting of autonomy reduction by reference to any, or all, of our three broad ways 
of discharging the onus argument. 
 
None of this, of course, counts against various parts of science being voluntary 
options in school nor against various tertiary educational institutions and employers 
stipulating various particular areas of science as pre-requisites for entry to a course or 
for employment but all of that is beside the point of my focus in this chapter upon all 
students being made to study science at school. 
 
 
CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIETY'S WEALTH? 
 
What, then, of the second of our putative warrants for science education - that of 
contributing to the nation's wealth? 
 
Presumably two of our onus-discharging categories of justification, that John will 
post-factum approve of the autonomy lost by Johnny, his earlier stage, and that 
science education is for John's individual benefit, are not so much the point here.  The 
focus of this putative warrant seems clearly to be "the good of the group". 
 
No doubt if one trawled through the economics literature, one would find ample 
evidence of correlations between a population's level of educational achievement and 
its collective material wealth.  There might even be a correlation between its level of 
education in science and its wealth.  That correlation might even be causally based 
such that, to some extent, the collective societal wealth level is caused by the level of 
science education (though no one would presumably claim the latter to be the 
proximate cause, even in part, of the former; the causal chain is going to have more 
connecting links, ones to do with the thoughts and activities of those scientifically 
educated). 
 
Let me allow all of this.  Although I am unaware of data analyses connected to 
anything finer grained than the first claim of the last paragraph, my possible ignorance 
of other levels of analysis is beside my point.  Even if all of the above claims were to 
be true, they do not constitute adequate enough descriptive premises to act in 
arguments discharging the onus facing the autonomy restrainer.   
 
It is hard to see how Johnny's school science education is going to help society's 
collective wealth except via John's job-related activity.  As such, much of the previous 
discussion applies again.  By all means one might target some areas of science, or 
some areas of science for some individuals, as ones conducive to wealth creation.  
Whatever the detail of all of this turns out to be, it is not even faintly plausible that 
much, if any, greater economic benefit will ensue if the net is spread more widely to 
include all students and the curriculum to cover the fairly comprehensive spread of 
disciplines and areas typical of school science curricula.  My suspicion is that, when 
one looks for causal connections, the story will be more particularised and such detail 
is masked by simply noting blanket relationships. 
 
Or so I assert.  The assertion seems obviously true to me but the history of science is 
larded with views that seemed obviously true at the time but came later to be held not 
to be.  So, as usual, I might have my facts wrong.  However, again as usual, it is not 
my task to fuss over much about this.  It is for those who would deploy appeal to such 
improvement in societal wealth (or economic benefit) as an aim of science education 
aim to discharge the onus.  It is for them to provide the data analyses supporting their 
claims that such consequences would, indeed, ensue and ensue better than with more 
targeted science education. 
 
Finally on this aim's use as a putative warrant, it is worth reiterating a point made in 
an earlier paper (Davson-Galle, 2006).  Even if it is established that, in virtue of what 
John ends up doing, it is true that Johnny having science education forced upon him 
will lead to an increase in society's wealth and, moreover, that it would be a large 
enough increase to outweigh the loss of Johnny's autonomy whilst at school, would 
the argument work too well for comfort?  If we are willing to metaphorically chain 
Johnny to his desk for the sake of the group's wealth, then why wouldn't such a 
warrant transfer, mutatis mutandis, to the case of John?  My surmise is that those who 
might think in terms of this sort of economic argument for science education would 
baulk at such an extension from Johnny's to John's autonomy being forcibly removed 
- but why?  Why wouldn't this be some sort of "ageist" double standard of an 
insupportable sort?  And, if the cases are morally relevantly similar, and the 
proscription on constraining John's autonomy for the sake of our wealth is upheld, 
then that case for constraining Johnny's autonomy would similarly collapse on pain of 
inconsistency. 
 
Of course, we sometimes do constrain adults' autonomy for the collective good in all 
sorts of ways.  But none of those seem to provide a precedent of any useful 
application here.  An obvious case is that of criminals and some criminals' actions 
(like large scale fraud, perhaps) have consequences for the group's wealth but 
presumably no one would suggest a parallel with school students.  They are not 
having their autonomy restriction proposed as a punishment.  A closer parallel, and 
one that operates in some countries, is that of forcing the unskilled unemployed (but 
not the unemployable) to engage in some sort of vocational training as a pre-condition 
of continuing to receive unemployment benefits from the group.  Assume that this is 
warranted, would it provide a way of discharging an onus that would transfer to our 
purported economic case for compulsory school science education?  I think not.  Look 
at the adult case more closely.  Basically, what is being relied upon is some sort of 
principle to the effect that no one has the right to be an economic burden upon the 
group if they have the potential not to be.  And, if that potential is not yet realised but 
could be with appropriately targeted retraining, then that retraining should occur, by 
force if need be.  But it is one thing to warrant autonomy restriction in order to 
achieve the benefit for the group of avoiding financially burdensome individuals and 
quite another to impose such a restriction in order to increase societal wealth.  I am an 
academic.  Were the job market for academic philosophers to collapse and I were to 
become unemployed and reliant upon the benevolence of the group, then it might be 
proper to insist that I retrain in some way so that my negative contribution ceases.  
Then again, pleasant way of life though it is for me and no negative financial drain on 
society (in that I have a salary, pay taxes and so on) there is little doubt that I could 
contribute better to increasing societal wealth by doing something other than 
philosophising.  Should I then be forced to retrain as a widget entrepreneur just 
because that would be of greater economic benefit for the group? 
 
I trust that the answer to the last question would be 'no'.  Given this, and assuming that 
young people should not be forced to do things for the group's benefit to any greater 
extent than old people have to, there are entailments here for the societal economic 
benefit rationale for compulsory school science education.  The most that seems 
warranted as an imposition on students' autonomy is that they are forced to do 
something or other that will (directly, or indirectly via being the foundation for later 
study) enable them not to be a financial burden upon the rest of us (assuming that they 
have that potential).  The focus is negative, not positive.  Their duty to the group is 
simply not to be a burden on it as opposed to positively contributing to it.  But such 
burden-avoidance might be achieved with no science education at all and via 
schooling totally devoted to preparing them for success as a widget entrepreneur, a 
subsistence-level, garret-living, artist, a clerk in a bank or even a society-rejecting 
survivalist hermit. 
 
To reiterate, we don't push adults around unless they impact negatively upon us.  
Maybe we should but I am operating on the moral assumption that we shouldn't.  We 
don't insist that adults contribute positively to the economy and forcibly retrain them 
if they do not do so and, unless a morally significant difference can be pointed to, we 
should not do so to students either.  At least, that is what consistency seems to 
demand and the onus is on anyone wishing to draw an age-based distinction to present 
arguments for its legitimacy.  Keep in mind that I am not presenting arguments for 
student autonomy (there is a literature within philosophy of education on that).  I am 
assuming that it is a good thing and it is for others to present arguments for its 
negation via forced science education.  
 
In any event, as touched upon above, the societal wealth argument hardly seems to 
hold promise as a warrant for science education being inflicted upon all students as 
opposed to it being inflicted upon some students as not all students would be able to 
contribute positively to the economy via what they learnt from their science education 
anyway. 
 





What, then, of our third putative way of discharging the onus - that compulsory 
science education is justified in virtue of it preparing students to "cope" in an 
increasingly technologically and scientifically sophisticated world?  This seems 
mostly to be in the camp of "benefit to the individual" as a type of warrant.  But does 
it succeed? 
 
One of the refrains of the previous discussion has been that the aims under scrutiny 
seemed, at best, to provide warrants for some, but not all, students undergoing forced 
science education in virtue of the fact that the future circumstances appealed to did 
not seem to apply across the board.  On the face of it, this aim looks more promising 
in that respect at least in that, except for folk like the Amish, all students will go on to 
live in such an increasingly technologically and scientifically sophisticated world.  So, 
the scope of the applicability of the warrant seems on safer ground than before.  
Despite this merit, the case also seems to be hopeless as a warrant for anything like a 
standard science curriculum being forced upon students.  This is for a number of 
reasons. 
 
The first of these rotates around the idea of "coping" - what counts as coping in a 
technologically and scientifically sophisticated society?  Consider the case of an ex-
colleague's father, a renowned symphony orchestra conductor.  Reportedly, if a light 
bulb in his house needed changing, he would call an electrician.  If the external rear-
vision mirrors on his car were out of adjustment, then he'd drive to the garage and get 
a service attendant to carry out the adjustment.  And so on.  Perhaps the story has 
been embellished in the telling but its truth or otherwise is irrelevant to its illustrative 
power.  Is such a person coping with the technology of light bulbs and cars?  I fail to 
see why one would bother to withhold judging that he is, albeit indirectly.  And, in 
any event, if not, then I fail to see that learning theories of electricity or optics or 
mechanics would assist.  Even in a very technologically and scientifically 
sophisticated environment (indeed, perhaps especially in such an environment) most 
people are but users of science and technology and can satisfactorily perform that role 
with minimal understanding of what they are using and with reliance upon the 
expertise of others and certainly without much of a glimmer of the science involved.  
That I now use a computer instead of a pen and paper to write this, does not require 
me to understand the boolean algebra employed in the software used in the computer 
(although, as it happens, I do). 
 
My second reason for dismissing this aim as a way of legitimately discharging the 
onus is to look at the mismatch of the areas of science covered in a standard school 
science curriculum and those manifested in those aspects of the world impinging upon 
citizens' lives.  For this warrant to work, one would have to show a fairly tight 
alignment.  I suggest that more is contained in usual science curricula than is so 
manifested.  Given this, the best that this sort of aim could justify would be a 
curriculum of less breadth than those for which warrants are sought. 
 
Finally, it is not as if one copes or does not in an on/off way.  Rather, one copes to a 
greater or lesser extent and what would have to be established by anyone attempting 
to discharge the onus by appealing to this "coping with science and technology" aim 
is that the individual would benefit sufficiently much more from the increased coping 
gained from science education to outweigh the loss of autonomy that is its cost.  I 
don't find the prospects of this demand being met to be great enough to provide any 
comfort for the advocate of compulsory science education. 
 
I take this, then, to be another failed warrant.   
 
Clearly, my view is that the foregoing attempts at discharging the onus fail in fairly 
clear-cut and obvious ways.  I am, of course, open to challenge concerning my 
discussion of them but, pending such counter-argument, I think that serious defenders 
of forcing standard school science curricula on un-unwilling students should look 
elsewhere for a viable warrant.  Others of our possible ways of discharging the onus 
look more promising. 
 
 
(INTRINSIC) WORTHWHILENESS OF SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING AS 
PART OF A LIBERAL EDUCATION? 
 
Another possible rationale for forced science education is, to my mind, the most 
promising.  This is the "liberal education" aim. 
 
What is at stake here is a conception of how we (or, in this chapter's case, I or you) 
want people to be.  This is not so much so that they can do things that I judge to be 
good (like become research scientists, or good citizens, or productive workers) either 
for their own sake, or that of the group.  Our previous discussion was of a broadly 
consequentialist sort in that I was discussing the merits of science education in terms 
of outcomes that would benefit them, or us, in the future.  The general pattern of 
discussion was to ask if, as a result of their science education and the knowledge and 
skills that are residual from it into their adult lives, there was (sufficiently) increased 
benefit across-the-board (for the individual and/or for the group) to warrant the 
blanket autonomy suppression involved.  Generally speaking, my judgement was that 
it was hard to see enough of an effect for enough people to warrant blanket 
prescription and forced acquisition.  Given the swiftly dismissive nature of my 
analysis, it didn't much matter that we were operating with a fairly rough and ready 
conception of the benefits involved.  I just "took it as read" that a nation being 
economically wealthy, or an individual being employed, or an individual being able to 
"cope" in a scientifically/technologically sophisticated society was a good thing 
without much bothering with the "why?" of things.  Even on a rough understanding of 
these, the problem was that there was a disconnection of an obvious sort between 
science education and these supposedly consequential goods and what the detail of 
any deeper story was as to what counted as a benefit was beside the argumentative 
point. 
 
At this stage of my discussion, however, I want to clarify things a little further 
(though still only as much as my argumentation demands as opposed to refining ideas 
in fine detail as an exercise in its own right). 
 
In the foregoing, if we were to ask questions like: 'what is employment, societal 
wealth or "coping" good for?', and then, whatever the answers, further ask what they 
were good for and kept asking, then, on pain of a vicious infinite regress, such a chain 
of justification would have to run out in one or more valued states of affairs where, if 
asked why that is such a good thing, the answer would be that it just is.  In short, that 
someone is, say, employed is extrinsically valuable and, in cashing out that extrinsic 
(or, as it is sometimes called, instrumental) value, we would, sooner or later, be 
appealing to something else that is intrinsically valued (in and of itself) as its deep 
motivating warrant. 
 
Without wishing to rehearse the byzantine details of utilitarian or consequentialist 
theories of ethics, I suggest that the likeliest candidate intrinsic value appealed to in 
cashing out answers to such questions would, in some sense, be human happiness.  
Why do we want someone prepared for the workforce? - because (with some 
intervening causal links) he would most likely have a happier life were he to be so 
prepared than if not.  Why do we want society to be economically wealthy? - because 
its citizens would have their happiness improved as a result.  Why do we want John to 
be able to "cope"? - because he would most likely have a happier life if he were to be 
able to than if not. 
 
As alluded to above, there are all sorts of complicating issues that are familiar within 
the moral philosophy literature but are unexplored here.  One is the tension between 
group happiness and individual happiness.  Depending on quite how the scarcely 
pellucid former gets cashed out, it might be best achieved by having John unhappy, a 
sacrificial lamb for the sake of the higher happiness of the group, collectively.  But 
such complexities are indicated only to be ignored.  My point is simply that, in some 
form or other, happiness is likely to be the intrinsic value at the bottom of the idea of 
individual or group benefit.  I wished to expose and stress this because the rationale 
that I wish now to explore, and with which I have some sympathy, has a different 
intrinsic value in mind in its putative warranting of forced science education.  
Moreover, it is one that is arrived at directly rather than via a chain of arguments 
connecting some extrinsic good with its ultimately warranting intrinsic one (happiness 
in the above discussion). 
 
The warrant appeals to some sort of conception of how all citizens should ideally be.  
It might well be a complicated picture with many elements and some of those 
elements might be in tension with others in that one couldn't maximise all of them in 
all citizens because more of one might involve less of the other.  We have seen this 
sort of tension illustrated above in that more happiness (via, say, more wealth) might 
be the cost of less autonomy.  As is almost always the case in ethical decisions on 
complex matters, it is difficult to sort out where one's sympathies lie in a neat rank 
order way and such decisions are complicated by issues of degree concerning how 
much loss of one thing is the cost of how much gain in the other.  My above 
judgements that the already considered putative warrants did not plausibly give 
enough benefit to outweigh the amount of autonomy loss that is their cost have 
already been nuanced by considerations of this sort as to the extent of benefit 
involved. 
 
This putative warrant is different though.  The claim is not that we, or John, will be 
happy as a result of some regimen of forced science education; rather, the appeal is to 
another intrinsically valued state of affairs, one that is part, at least, of my conception 
of how all citizens should ideally be.  How so? 
 
I will assume that the style of science education involved is meant to give students 
some knowledge of how the world works (or, at least, of our best warranted 
hypotheses concerning that).  I am not, that is, concerned to consider any case for 
some of the more radical constructivist construals of science education4.  I also 
assume that such science education is meant to give some grasp of how it is that such 
knowledge is arrived at and of why it is that such views receive that imprimatur as 
knowledge.  Call these: 'knowledge about the world', 'knowledge of scientific method' 
and 'knowledge of the epistemic status of scientific claims'. 
 
What might thus be claimed is that science education is worth losing some autonomy 
for because it is an intrinsically good thing for individual citizens to have those three 
types of knowledge as part of their intellectual suite.  I mean this primarily as a good 
thing for the individual.  There is no suggestion that it is good for the group in any 
way that is not merely additive of those individual intrinsic goods5.  Nor, to repeat, 
am I claiming that any happiness benefit will flow to the individual by having su
knowledge - it might, it might not; but that is not the motivation here.  The suggestion 
is simply that, other things being equal, an individual having such knowledge is an 
intrinsically better individual than one relevantly ignorant.  In some sense, a better 
ch 
                                                 
4  For discussions of Constructivism in science education, see my 1999 paper, the papers in the 1998 
anthology edited by Michael Matthews (and Harvey Siegel's 2004 essay review of it) and Andreas 
Quayle's 2007 paper; apart from these, the journal Science and Education is generally a rich lode of ore 
to mine on this topic. 
5 See my 2006, pages 28-29 (of this online version) for a fuller discussion of this "merely additive" 
point. 
life is lived just in virtue of knowing something of the workings of the world, of how 
that knowledge has been arrived at and of why such knowledge claims should be 
deemed justified. 
 
Others' moral priorities might differ but all of this strikes me as having more chance 
of successfully discharging our onus as would-be autonomy reducers than our 
previously considered candidates.  In answer to the old question: 'what is the good 
life?', I, at least, am inclined to reply that, in part anyway, it is a life lived in 
knowledge of the matters listed.  And the suggestion that such knowledge is so 
intrinsically valuable than it is worth forcing people (or is it just students?6) to acquire 
it, is a suggestion that has justificatory promise - at least by reference to my priorities.  
After all, I have not said that nothing could ever be warranted that involved forced 
acquisition; all that I have suggested is that forced science education doesn't seem 
warranted by our earlier considered possibilities.  One fault with some earlier putative 
warrants was that the many suffered autonomy loss for the individual good of the few 
or, at best for the good of the group via what that few might do.  This concern seems, 
on the face of it anyway, not to apply here.  Each person would be a better person 
(other things being equal) with such a suite of knowledge than without it. 
 
But there is another worry with this putative rationale, one that has concerned me in 
the past when considering the inclusion of compulsory philosophy of science in 
school curricula (Davson-Galle, 2006).  How much of an intellectual transformation is 
it reasonable to expect science education to achieve across-the-board and how much 
decay of that intellectual state would occur over time? 
 
Answers to these questions will, I suggest, depend on just what one has in mind here.  
Two things are, however, blatantly obvious.  First, the more abstract and complex the 
ideas involved, the more difficult it will be for them to be established in students' 
minds by science education.  Second, the more the curriculum is a mass of detail, the 
more that detail will, generally, be forgotten. 
 
The former is a concern but the latter is not.  Considering the latter point about detail, 
I am not advocating anything like a detailed content-rich traditional science 
curriculum working through the detail of laws of physics, chemical formulae and 
reactions, biological taxonomies and so forth.  That such detailed clutter is lost 
quickly upon leaving school doesn't particularly upset me because that is not the level 
of understanding which I am considering as possibly being worth forcing upon 
students.  What I have in mind here is a "broad sweep" introduction to our scientific 
understanding of ourselves and the universe of which we are part7.  If we are talking 
of across-the-board science education, then what I would value is a skeletal treatment 
of the major ideas and themes of our current scientific picture of things with the flesh 
to be left to later specialist training or to those voluntarily pursuing such further 
knowledge.  Of course all of this is rather vague and the chapter and verse of such a 
curriculum's content would be a largish task to articulate and would, no doubt, involve 
considerable debate even among those inclined to agree with such a shift from 
detailed science content to a focus merely upon "big ideas".  That chapter and verse 
will not be pursued in this chapter. 
                                                 
6 There is a concern here: were adults not to value being as we value them being, should we force them 
to comply with our template, not just as to how they must behave but, as to the contents of their minds? 
7 See Matthews, 1994, Chapter 3 on trends of this sort of a decade or so ago. 
 
Of course we could, with enough time, do both the big ideas and the detail.  My point 
is simply that, so far, I can't warrant to myself such further loss of student autonomy 
especially when so little of the detail would be retained over time. 
 
Mind you, even a "big picture" science curriculum has concerns to be raised.  It seems 
plausible that discussion-style pedagogy might be best suited to moving students' 
frameworks of belief from whatever they start with to the preferred framework.  If the 
latter is not to be merely dogmatically held (and I find a dogmatically held set of 
beliefs to dubiously count as an intrinsic good) then students will have to not just hold 
the beliefs but understand something of how they came to be held and why that 
process is epistemically meritorious (if it is8). (These constitute the second and third 
areas of knowledge articulated above. 
 
Here things become awkward fast. 
 
These points, about the methods of scientific enquiry and about the epistemic 
justification of scientific frameworks of belief, become complex and sophisticated as 
soon as one enquires seriously into them.  The latter one, concerning epistemology, is 
one that I have addressed previously (Davson-Galle, 2006) and the results of my 
analysis then were not sanguine.  As observed above, the more abstract the material 
that is taught the less likely it is to be understood across a school cohort.  Yet, if even 
the "broad brush" ideas of science are to be understood in a non-dogmatic way, then 
some grasp of epistemology is enjoined.  I won't rehearse the detail of the earlier 
paper but the upshot of my analysis was that, beyond the most basic level of (partly 
misleading) "Nature of Science"-style dogma, epistemological understanding is not 
plausibly achievable to any great extent.  There is some dispute as to what would be 
on the list9 of uncontroversial claims about the nature of science but say that, with 
respect to epistemic elements, some sorts of propositions like the following were 
among those that were the target for Johnny (and, later, John) to have as items of 
knowledge: 'one should generally believe what scientists are confident is true, because 
those beliefs are based upon observation and experiment (although belief should 
always be tentative because new data may be difficult for current theories to explain 
or new theories might be invented that to an even better job of explaining existing 
data)'. 
 
This is fine, the philosophically naive might think.  But it leaves all the hard epistemic 
questions un-addressed and un-answered.  Yet to pursue that complexity is, as I have 
noted in that earlier paper, unfeasible.  Perhaps I am overly pessimistic but I will 
simply rest this chapter's case upon the assumption of that earlier paper's 
argumentation's soundness. 
 
In short, across the spread of school students, anything but achieving mere assertion 
of epistemic stances that are, perforce, overly simplistic, is not an available option.  
But is what is perhaps available, mere "learning off" of epistemic propositions, worth 
its cost in autonomy?  In particular, is having such a collection of epistemic beliefs 
about the status of science of any intrinsic merit?  In that previous paper, when I 
                                                 
8 See the references on Constructivism mentioned in Note 4, above. 
9 See Matthews, 1994, pp. 37-40 for a candidate list and McComas et al., 1998, p. 513 for another one 
(a version of the latter paper occurs as Chapter 1 of McComas, 2000). 
considered this question as part of a more general question about the role of 
philosophy of science in school science, I was in two minds concerning this but I was 
inclined to think that it might well be.  However, the more I consider the merit of 
possessing such simplistic beliefs the more I consider it to be dubious that they are of 
any intrinsic benefit as part of the framework of belief of an intellectual agent. 
 
Consider the way that I spoke earlier.  I listed three items of knowledge that might be 
judged intrinsically worthwhile for citizens to have.  If the most that most students 
can have as a curriculum outcome is mere belief that such and such warrants a 
scientific hypothesis, then they don't seem to have epistemic knowledge concerning 
the status of such (putative) warrants.  Certainly they don't have their epistemic views 
"first-person" warranted by having worked through the epistemological debates in the 
manner that academic philosophers might.  Of course, in and of itself, that might not 
matter for the status of the belief as knowledge.  It is familiar for epistemic agents to 
distribute such justificatory tasks so that much of what we would ordinarily claim that 
we know is justified on the basis of testimony.  I hold a belief on the basis that a body 
of experts in that area hold that belief and that they have done their epistemic 
homework and are able to justify their views.  In short, I am an epistemic parasite 
upon their expertise and judgement. 
 
Generally speaking, this is quite sound practice and, indeed, unavoidable unless one is 
to have an enormously restricted subset of one's beliefs that one can claim to know.  
Of course there is one glitch with this.  In effect, what is being said is that I know 
because the experts know and I know that they know.  It is the last bit that is 
problematic.  One of the difficulties in sub-contracting epistemic tasks to others is 
knowing to whom that task can be safely passed.  It is notorious that some humans are 
gullible in their endorsement of various "new-age" religious and alternative medical 
beliefs and practices on the basis of "expert" advice.  I will assume that some such 
"experts" are deluded and their positive answers to a request for epistemic assurance: 
'do you know this stuff to be true?' would be very unwisely relied upon10. 
 
The problem is by no means a trivial one.  The United States would count as a fairly 
intellectually sophisticated country by world standards yet it is also well known as as 
having a surprisingly high proportion of Christians of a fairly unsophisticated sort 
with anti-scientific frameworks of belief11.  Such people have undergone some sort of 
science education and, presumably, adjudicating between conflicting "experts" 
endorsing and advocating conflicting propositions on the same issue is part of the 
problem they face, and have failed to cope with, as intellectual agents.  But upon what 
basis can they sensibly choose? 
 
One way to assist such agents is to walk them through a detailed exercise in 
philosophising about semantic and epistemic issues at hand.  But, as noted above, this 
is simply beyond most students (and, I would suggest, teachers, for that matter) if 
what is in mind is a sophisticated enough engagement with the epistemic issues 
                                                 
10 Nor is the problem automatically just a problem to be found in some sort of intellectual fringe; 
controversies occur within the mainstream as well - the philosophical naivety of a good number of 
mainstream scientists is notorious within philosophy of science. 
11 See Mahner and Bunge, 1996, on religious and scientific views' incompatibility and Matthews, 1994, 
p. 34 (and the "conceptual change" literature generally) on the persistence in students of what would be 
deemed to be false views despite them having undergone science education. 
involved to be able to sort "sheep from goats" in choosing whose testimony to trust as 
a suitable authority on the matters at hand.  One can assert authority and offer "Nature 
of Science" nostra for simple acceptance but the issue remains that others might offer 
contrary advice. 
 
This sounds to be quite a bind for students' chances of scientific knowledge.  They 
can't justify their first-order scientific beliefs in any direct way by their own epistemic 
thought.  Nor do they have the capacity to sensibly choose which of a range of 
competing claimants to authority to trust as legitimate sources of testimony to warrant 
their views indirectly. 
 
As far as I can see, this rules them out as having scientific knowledge in the sense of 
knowing that their scientific beliefs are justified.  Admittedly, that doesn't stop those 
views been indeed justified12.  The epistemic status of an agent's beliefs is not 
automatically as that agent is in a position to judge.  Thus Johnny's belief in various 
propositions of science might be without him being able to give any satisfactory 
warrant (of either a direct or an indirect sort) for such beliefs yet they might be 
warranted in the sense that epistemically competent judges judge them to be so. 
 
So, were we to be optimistic13 about the epistemic status of the broad architecture of 
some scientific framework of beliefs, could we legitimately force belief in such a 
framework upon Johnny in virtue of it being, indeed, knowledge, despite us being 
unable to have Johnny capable of judging that it is so?  In effect, that is for us to ask 
him to take the offered propositions on trust without him being in a position to 
properly judge us as a trustworthy source of testimony.  Why should he take our view 
rather than that of Pastor Pangloss of the Blessed Brethren of the Shoe?  I don't see 
how we can answer this question in a way that is both generally comprehensible to 
students and philosophically legitimate. 
 
I deal with this issue of epistemic warrant at some length because it strikes me as a 
very serious issue for this "intrinsic worthwhileness" attempt to warrant a forced 
acquisition of at least the broad framework of a scientific picture of the world.  
Assuming the above pessimism about being able to rationally justify a scientific belief 
system to Johnny, science education (or, perhaps, "education") is tantamount to a 
form of indoctrination.  As observed above, it is by no means clear to me that 
students' possession of a framework of belief that is held without conscious warrant is 
a state of affairs that I would favour in and of itself.  (This is not, of course, to say that 
such a state of affairs is not extrinsically worthwhile; it might well be.  But if such a 
framework of belief is good for something else to an extent that warrants imposing it 
by force, then there had better be some justification available that is more satisfactory 
than the ones considered in earlier sections of this chapter.)   
 
But what perhaps could be known by students is not that, say, species evolved by 
natural selection of some genetic variations over others but that most biologists 
believe that.  Presumably this would require something like survey data concerning 
biologists' views being available.  Yet, if so, then the same issues arise again.  Do 
students have to follow enough statistics to see why some survey data warrants a 
                                                 
12 Dancy, 1985 is a readable introduction to these matters; see Chapter 9 in particular. 
13 Again, see Dancy, 1985; this time, Chapter 1. 
particular interpretation?  This is obviously too big an ask.  Should they, then, just 
take things on trust and judge the survey claims as trustworthy testimony given that 
the work was done by reputable authorities?  There is certainly enough dodgy social 
science around to cause some misgivings here14 thus the issue of judging claims to 
authority arises again. However, independently of the issue of surveys, one might 
assume that if a set of views is presented in textbooks, then that shows that such views 
constitute accepted conventional scientific wisdom.  There is, of course, some danger 
that texts are over-simplified or just out of date but we are, after all, only talking of 
broad frameworks so perhaps they could be allowed to be a close enough 
approximation to "conventional wisdom".  So, despite some misgivings, let me allow 
that there would be no great epistemic impediment to students being able to know that 
most scientists (in a field) believe such and such a suite of views.  They could know 
that a thesis was conventional wisdom in science without knowing the thesis itself 
(that is, without themselves having any justified belief in it).  Would such knowledge 
about scientists and their beliefs be worth having (in and of itself)?  Maybe not. 
 
In effect, this would amount to Johnny knowing that one particular intellectual 
institution's members believe the world to be thus and so.  Johnny might also know 
that those scientists believe their views to be justified.  He might even believe those 
views himself15. What he doesn't know is whether these views are to be trusted or not.  
But what is so great about this situation?  Is this an intrinsically worthwhile way for 
an intellectual agent to be?  Not in my view. 
 
So, my present inclination is to think that this epistemic roadblock undermines the 
claim that student belief in the broad framework ideas of science is worth having in 
and of itself.  So much, then, for the third and first of the three knowledge elements 
that I had in mind as constituting a possibly intrinsically valuable version of science 
education; what of the second: scientific method? 
 
Others may differ in their value-judgements but I had this in mind as part of a package 
with that package being intrinsically valuable.  Concerning science, what would be 
intrinsically good would be for those three items of knowledge to be possible but if 
the only one that is possible is knowledge of the methods of scientific enquiry, would 
that be intrinsically worthwhile just by itself?  Not to me.   
 
In any event, it is not at all clear that such knowledge is any more available than its 
fellows anyway.  My previous concern, the general inability of students/citizens to 
comprehend complex and abstract ideas, arises again.  There are at least two 
construals of this "knowing scientific method/s" potential aspect of science education.  
One is a normative, a priori, conception of how scientists should go about their 
enquiries.  The other is a social science style description of how scientists happen to 
go about their business.  I said that the former was normative.  This is now a 
somewhat un-popular meta-philosophical conception of the intellectual status of 
philosophy of science.  In effect, it suggests that philosophy of science might 
legitimately say something like: 'scientists should pursue their enquiries in such and 
such a manner, not in the manner that they are'.  On the latter, one simply reports that 
scientists do, as it happens, pursue their enquiries in so and so a manner.  Whether 
                                                 
14 See Huck and Sandler's (1979) delightful analyses of dubiously interpreted data in published 
research reports.  
15 But see Note 11, above 
philosophy of science has this intellectual authority over science is controversial and 
it is no task of this chapter to engage in such meta-philosophy16.  My purposes in 
mentioning this distinction are two. 
 
First, if one takes the normative construal of knowing the methods of science, then the 
issues are basically epistemic ones about the justifiability of the candidate method of 
operating in seeking to know what the world is like and my above discussion of this 
with its attendant pessimism applies again.  In short, even if such knowledge is 
intrinsically worthwhile, the justification of such epistemic claims is a very complex 
business and having adequately considered views on such matters is beyond most 
students17.   
 
Second, if one instead construes the knowledge as merely descriptive of the practice 
of scientists, then I will allow that such knowledge might be as readily available as 
our earlier discussed knowledge of what theses scientists in the field would subscribe 
to as true.  Again there methodological concerns about the sorts of social scientific 
enquiry that yield such generalisations but, again, I will pass over any such hesitations 
and allow that such knowledge is available and that students could, at least, know that 
scientists pursue their enquiries in such and such a way (or ways).  Here the issue is 
the worthwhileness of such mere knowledge that scientists act in certain ways without 
the capacity to appraise those actions.  (Compare knowing that witchdoctors act in 
certain ways.) And note that it will have to be sufficiently worthwhile to warrant 
forcing such knowledge upon students.  Again, I can't see enough value in such 
knowledge to warrant its forced acquisition.  Others may differ of course but, if so, 
they should at least be clear that in attempting to warrant this aspect of possible 
science education as an element of a broader liberal education, then it is mere 
knowledge that practices occur without the capacity to appraise the legitimacy of 
those practices.  (Again, compare this with knowing that witch doctors act in certain 
ways.)   
 
The upshot of all of this is that, despite its initial appeal (to me at least but it is 
certainly a common view), trying to warrant forced acquisition of a broad framework 
of scientific views in virtue of having such scientific knowledge being an intrinsically 
valuable thing seems to fail because the views in question would not be held by 
students as things that they know but would, at most, have the status of mere belief or, 
at best, knowledge that others have certain beliefs.  And, I suggest, that is not status 
enough to be intrinsically valuable enough to over-ride agents' own wishes about the 
contents of their own mind.  In any event, if some version of this warrant is accepted, 
it would have to be by valuing mere belief as the desired state.  The merit of such 
mere belief in central tenets of science as opposed to, say, superstition, would be their 
truth.  This may be enough for some but not for me.  This is, though, the closest of 
those that I consider to constituting a satisfactory aim upon which to rest discharge of 
the onus. 
  
So, another failed attempt.  So far, so bad for justifying forced science education but 
what of our remaining putative rationales?  As said before, however, even if what is 
                                                 
16 See my 1990 for my engagement with that issue. 
17 And, as touched on already, I suggest that teachers and scientists would find the same issues out of 
their field of expertise - my point does not, however, depend on  the truth of that suggestion. 
learnt from compulsory science education is not intrinsically valuable, that does not 
stop it being extrinsically valuable. 
 
 
PURSUING LIFE GOALS 
 
One thing that is sometimes advanced as a rationale for compulsory schooling is that 
students should be made to acquire various skills, items of knowledge and affective 
qualities because such things are "enabling"; in particular, they are things that assist 
students to successfully pursue their own life goals.  As an illustration, being able to 
read and write and to communicate in a comprehensible way with substantial 
conformity to linguistic conventions is a precondition for pursuing most life goals 
especially if those goals require funding and the usual available source of sufficient 
money is via paid employment.  Of course, there would be exceptions to this but, 
except when it is clear who these exceptions are (those severely intellectually 
disabled, or those with a substantial inheritance, for instance) it would seem that the 
probabilities favour forced literacy (to at least some set level) for all.  Generally, this 
would seem to be a rationale that would discharge the onus in two ways.  The first is 
that whatever Johnny might think of forced literacy, John is likely to retrospectively 
approve of it in that he appreciates being able to better pursue his life goals.  Second, 
for most life goals at least, having such goals achieved is likely to be for John's 
individual benefit. 
 
I mean this literacy case only as an illustration and it doesn't matter if the above 
sketch is overly optimistic about its chances of success in discharging the onus in this 
"pursuit of one's own life goals" way.  My point is: can compulsory science education 
(in some usually discussed variation or other) manage such a route to discharging the 
onus?  In a word, no. 
 
For this putative rationale for forced science education to succeed, enough of the 
skills, content and so forth acquired by school science students would have to be 
present to a sufficient extent to contribute sufficiently to enough life goals of enough 
students (and without superior substitute causal elements being readily enough 
available) to outweigh the degree of across-the-board loss of autonomy that is entailed 
by the forced acquisition.  I have left this as one rather convoluted sentence to 
emphasise just how many "boxes have to be ticked" here.  The rationale won't work if 
enough individuals' life goals don't involve the deployment of whatever they would 
gain from science education.  Nor would it work if, although relevant, things would 
not be in place to enough of an extent to have the effect desired.  And so on down the 
various qualifications just listed. 
 
Note in particular the presence again of those qualifiers to do with the degree or 
extent of the success of the relevant causal connection.  This focus upon the extent of 
the achievement of ends is a recurring theme of the chapter. 
 
Looking down my list, my judgement is that someone appealing to this sort of warrant 
in discharge of the onus is near doomed to failure.  As is also a recurring theme of the 
chapter, I know of no empirical research that tracks such connections and, while I 
would be delighted to be pointed to such work, I simply don't think that it exists; and, 
if I am correct in this, then the appeal to the usefulness of science in the pursuit of 
one's life goals constitutes rhetoric without proper empirical support.  Education is too 
expensive of society's resources and individuals' freedom to rest on mere rhetoric. 
 
One intermediary link in the causal chain from science education (as means) to goal 
satisfaction (as end) is if the goal is not directly science-connected but involves 
money.  As was touched upon in the literacy illustration, the most common route to 
having money is employment and if the skills and knowledge etc acquired from 
science education were sufficiently connected to the performance of a sufficient 
number of jobs then our justificatory task would be more clearly satisfied.  But, as 
discussed in an earlier section, it is simply blatantly obviously false that enough jobs 
require the spread of knowledge and skills under discussion for that to constitute a 
warrant for their acquisition. 
 
So, if this warrant is to work, one would have to be suggesting some other causal 
connection of either an indirect sort (as with the employment case but involving some 
different intermediary link) or a direct sort (where pursuing one's goal directly utilises 
scientific knowledge or skill). 
 
I can come up with various instances of particular connections (as I can with all of our 
putative warrants) but the difficulty facing the advocate of forced science education is 
that, to discharge the onus, there has to be something (or a summation of individual 
somethings) that applies fairly much across-the-board.  Unless this is so, we are again 
replying to a student challenge with the unsatisfactory response: 'you all have to do all 
of this because some bits of it will prove to be useful, and in some cases necessary, 
for some of you achieving some of your life goals'.  The trouble is that it is obviously 
not so. 
 
I take this to be an obviously failed warrant. 
 
 
BECOMING A "GOOD CITIZEN"? 
 
The last candidate sets out to warrant science education by suggesting that it has a 
role to play in preparing students to fulfil the role of citizen.  Of our three broad 
warrant strategies, this seems to most firmly fall into the camp of force being justified 
by appeal to the good of the group. 
 
Allow that we have some sort of broad aim of schooling generally being that it should 
help turn students into good citizens (or, perhaps, less directively, provide them with 
skills and knowledge that will assist them in being able to act as good citizens18).  
Even so, can we warrant the forcing of science education as being a sufficiently 
important part of the means for the achievement of the end: "good citizens"? 
 
I take the science education literature to consider this to be a major justification for 
school science19.  I have considered this type of warrant in a past paper (Davson-
Galle, 2006) but as a warrant that might be held to justify compulsory philosophy of 
                                                 
18 Note that one should distinguish being able to do something from doing it; one obvious way in 
which the former, but not the latter might obtain is if one is without relevant motivation. 
19 See Driver et al., 1996, p. 18 and Bell and Lederman, 2003, p. 353 for some discussion of what 
Driver called 'the democratic argument'; see also Matthews, 1994, Chapter 3 (especially p.36). 
science education (especially the ethics of science) and ended up thinking that it failed 
in that task.  This is, however, a different kettle of fish and perhaps forced science 
education can be warranted in this way even if forced education in philosophy of 
science can't be.  Despite that different focus, there are some similarities in my 
argumentative strategy to that earlier treatment. 
 
As will be a familiar refrain by now, the tasks facing the would-be onus discharger are 
many. 
 
First, "good citizen" has to be unpacked. 
Second, the knowledge, skills and attitudes that would be gained from science 
education that, prima facie, would seem to play some role as means to the 
achievement of the end of having good citizens will need to be identified. 
Third, these plausible "means-end" connection claims' soundness would have to be 
investigated and, in particular, two things would have to be clear: for what percentage 
of students we would get what degree of achievement of those aimed that ends and, 
for how long such achievement would last. 
Fourth, the pervasiveness, extent and persistence of the effects of the science 
education curriculum would have to morally add up to enough of a benefit to 
outweigh the loss of autonomy that is their cost. 
 
As will be predicted, I find each of these tasks to be problematic. 
 
First, the idea of the "good citizen" here seems to be one that has as one of its 
elements, the citizen making, or being able to make, decisions of a certain sort.  (Note 
again the disjunction here.  It is one thing to have a capacity and another to exercise 
it.) So, what decisions are in mind here? 
 
In this context, presumably the focus would be on decisions that involve the 
application of scientific knowledge and/or the exercise of the skills of scientific 
enquiry and/or the  influence of the affective attitudes typically driving scientific 
enquiry.  Given that the driving idea is that of the "good citizen", I take it that it would 
be only those decisions that impact upon the group that we are talking about.  As 
earlier, I will consider this impact to eventually appeal to the happiness levels of the 
group. 
 
So, we have citizens making decisions and some of those decisions affect the 
happiness of the group.  Good decisions of this sort by citizens are those that increase 
the happiness of the group (or, at least, avoid decreasing it).  In order to make some 
such good decisions, a citizen would have to have the sorts of knowledge, skills or 
attitudes fostered in school science curricula.  Other things being equal, the extent to 
which someone is a good citizen is a function of the extent to which, when faced with 
such decisions, they make good ones.  Even at this stage, I have two concerns. 
 
One is that it is by no means clear to me just how many science-using civic decisions 
are actually faced by citizens.  Nor, of those, how many are of very much importance 
to the happiness of the group.  No doubt some citizens are in the thick of things but 
for this to be a warrant for science education for all students, one would want one of 
two things to obtain.  Either a fair majority of citizens will be in such decision 
circumstances often enough for their employment of the science forced upon them in 
school to generate enough group happiness to outweigh the across-the-board loss of 
autonomy involved or, alternatively, it may be that only a minority will be in such 
decisions situations but we can't, with enough probability, predict who and the 
decisions those few will make will be of such importance that it is worth society 
inflicting the knowledge (etc) on all students for the sake of the increased group 
happiness generated by the few who actually get to use their school science.  Of 
course, to pick up on the earlier disjunction, we are also going to be making 
assumptions about citizens bothering to engage in such decision-making and, if they 
do, using their scientific knowledge (etc) to inform, and partly guide, their decisions. 
 
In short, with respect to the civic decisions made by good citizens, it is not at all clear 
what the likelihood is of enough citizens being faced by, and willing to engage in, 
enough science-informed decisions of enough importance that the resultant boost in 
group happiness outweighs the autonomy loss.  Perhaps there is some empirical 
research on this issue but, as usual, my impression is that there is not (I know of 
none).  Unless there is, the chances of this putative way of discharging the onus being 
anything beyond empty rhetoric are slim. 
 
Moreover, to return to the idea of the "good citizen", the role played by science in 
being such a citizen is, at best, partial.  First, all that such science can supply to the 
arguments constituting rational deliberation about the issue at hand is what I earlier 
called 'descriptive premises'.  What it won't do is supply moral premises20 articulating 
the ethical stances driving the decision.  One can be scientifically informed 
concerning the options facing one in a decision situation yet be evil and choose an 
option that is anything but for the benefit of the group.  It might be objected that no 
one is suggesting that science would be the whole story of such civic decision-
making, just an important part21.  Such a response is, however, unsatisfactory. 
 
If one is to warrant science education by appeal to its role in producing good citizens 
and unpack the relevant part of that as making good decisions then the warrant will 
not work if what one gets is scientifically informed but bad decisions.  The moral and 
descriptive premises conjoin to generate the decision and, unless the former properly 
in place, then it is hard to see how just the latter would be of much use in the 
attainment of the desired outcome. 
 
A further problem here is that the most effective way of producing citizens with good 
values is by indoctrinating those values into them.  There is possibly something to be 
said for this22 but note that there are all sorts of concerns about the whole notion of 
what the right values might be, ones that the briefest of forays into any undergraduate 
text in moral philosophy will make manifest23.  I earlier unpacked the idea of a good 
citizen as one acting for the happiness of the group because that has been my 
impression of the values driving this putative justification of science education.  
However, that that is what one should be aiming for is itself controversial24.  In any 
                                                 
20 See my 2002 and, more elaborately, my (forthcoming) 2008. 
21 Focusing on this aspect is what people usually have in mind when talking of someone making an 
informed decision. 
22 I have discussed this in my 1995a and 1995b. 
23 See my forthcoming 2008, Chapter 9, for a sketch of some of the issues. 
24 The proposal is a version of Utilitarianism and the moral philosophy literature is extensive on the 
issues. 
event, it is one thing to be confident that you have a set of values that you are happy 
to endorse and another thing to be willing to indoctrinate them in other people.  Any 
such indoctrination of "good values" inherently involves further loss of freedom of 
thought (on those matters) and is, indeed, a somewhat more severe and long-lasting 
negation of autonomy than the limited prison-sentence style loss of autonomously 
directed time that is entailed by most compulsory curricula (including forced 
acquisition of scientific knowledge and skill). 
 
Finally on this point, even if it were thought that it was good enough that having and 
deploying scientific knowledge was an aspect of acting in the manner of a good 
citizen, this putative justification would only work if there were not other aspects that 
were in rivalry with science education and even better served the end of having good 
citizens.  This is no slight concern.  Given the limited amount of time available for 
schooling and the jostling of competing claimants for time and space, to include 
science is to exclude something else.  Perhaps better analytical skills in making 
critical sense of complex issues would be time better spent than learning science, or a 
greater understanding of political history, or... and so on.   
 
Anyway, there are rival ends suggested as curricular aims that might be worthier of 
pursuit.  For instance, think back to the earlier quick discussion of being able to 
pursue one's own life goals.  Such an aim would likely involve different curricular 
foci than a "good citizens" one. 
 
All in all, as soon as one begins to think seriously about the idea of students becoming 
good citizens as a possible motivating end for forced science education, problems 
emerge that are not manifest if things are left at the rhetorical level of "feel good" 
slogans. 
 
A second task facing those tempted to follow this path to discharge of the onus is to 
articulate a little more clearly the aspects of the mooted science curriculum that are 
seen as serving the "good citizen" end. 
 
One trouble here is much as before.  Is it really possible to see the spread of 
disciplines of science and topics within them that constitute a usual science 
curriculum as all being relevant to the sort of science-involving decisions that citizens 
might face?  I think not but the onus is on those using this aim to warrant compulsion 
to supply more detailed "chapter and verse" analyses.  My hypothesis is that, at best, 
what would end up being warranted as a result of any such analysis would only be 
various fragments of science. 
 
No doubt some students will face situations where they are will be wanting to make 
decisions (as voters, say) and, in order for such decisions to be well-informed, some 
scientific knowledge would have to be utilised as descriptive premises in the 
arguments constitutive of their deliberations.  But even in such cases, it is simply not 
at all clear how much use school science education would be.  This is not because 
most of it would be forgotten (though I find that plausible) but because the science 
involved in such decision-making is usuallytoo complex to have been covered at 
school level. Two illustrations will suffice.   
 
At the time of writing, citizens in my region are in dispute about the desirability of a 
pulp mill (turning woodchips into pulp for paper manufacture) being built.  One issue 
among many is if the proposed mill will impact upon the environment in various ways 
to an extent that, for some citizens at least, would be deemed to be a negative that 
would outweigh plausible economic benefits arising from the mill25. 
 
Environmental groups have commissioned scientific advice, as has the company 
proposing the mill and the State government has an odd history of setting up one 
appraisal process, aborting it and then hiring external consultants to produce another 
report in a faster manner.  Needless to say, there have been competing claims about 
the lack of disinterestedness of each of these parties in choosing what scientific claims 
to put forward and emphasise but there has also been some first-order scientific 
dispute concerning those claims themselves.  Will such and such a level of the 
mission of this gas, or that liquid effluent, produce this particular effect upon humans 
or that effect on seals or...?  Will such a mill produce so-and-so level of toxic product 
or only such and such a level?  And so on. 
 
Even if I remembered all that my science teachers had taught me, I can't see how that 
would help me in such a decision situation.  I am in the hands of the experts.  The best 
that I can manage is trying to decide which experts to believe; in terms used earlier, to 
whom I should "sub-contract" such premises in virtue of them being appropriate 
authorities.  This is a difficult business and, as noted, school science is scarcely going 
to help. 
 
A second, more general, example is the global warming controversy.  Again, 
competing claims are made and, curiously, it might seem as if the issue is resolved 
and that I can confidently trust that global warming is indeed a fact and, moreover, 
significantly caused by humans.  In short, whatever debates there have been in the 
past, isn't the issue now settled?  Fine but then there bursts upon the scene an article in 
the serious press counselling caution on the grounds that the vast majority of scientists 
have agreed on things before and been shown to be subsequently wrong and that they 
might be wrong this time as well because they seem to be not properly considering a 
rival hypothesis emphasising the role of cycles of solar emissions - at least according 
to some scientists. 
 
Again, I have a conflict among competing authorities' testimony and my school 
science will not be of any use in adjudicating such disputes.  Even if it seemed to me 
that, say, the solar emissions theory is more plausible than the rising CO2 levels 
theory, some of those better educated in science than I am would disagree.  Why 
should I trust my own semi-ignorant appraisal?  But if not, whom to believe? 
 
The issues that I wish to come from these two examples are that, even if I recalled all 
of my school science and explicitly deployed it in making science-involving decisions 
facing me as a citizen, it is simply not at all plausible that the right connections exist 
between what is acquired in school science and the making of "good decisions", even 
to the limitedextent of making merely scientifically informed decisions. 
 
                                                 
25 In pondering upon this example one can perhaps entertain the idea that compulsory economics would 
be another candidate school curriculum item. 
It might be objected here that no one was ever suggesting that school science will 
cover the sort of chemical, biological and medical issues that arise in the pulp mill 
case, for instance.  The claim would rather be that it would provide a basis for 
acquiring the relevant scientific knowledge so that an informed decision could then be 
made. 
 
At best, this sort of argument would seem to warrant aspects of school science but not 
the full spread of topics as not all of those topics would plausibly perform such a 
"basis providing" function.  However, this is not the major difficulty.  It is simply not 
established by research (and is, in any event, implausible) that even if citizens were to 
retain what was taught to them in their school science curricula, most would have the 
capacity to build upon that basis to become scientifically informed upon the issues or 
even to become informed enough to adjudicate among rival candidate authorities.  
Nor is it even established that a sufficient proportion of citizens will so use their 
science education to even attempt to become informed and (assuming other decision-
making elements are present) make good decisions such that the resultant group 
benefit gained from this intellectually active subset of students warrants across-the-
board compulsion to ensure that the subset is "caught and taught".  Moreover, one 
would have to be confident that this subset could not be predicted in advance (so that 
one could, instead, selectively force science only upon those who are likely to 
produce such future group benefit).  One would also have to be confident that, without 
school science, they would not be able to become sufficiently scientifically informed 
on an ad hoc basis in various decision situations to generate the benefit.  That 
concerned citizens might pursue relevant knowledge regardless of what they learnt in 
school is not, on the face of it, an implausible suggestion to make.  As is a familiar 
refrain in this chapter, I contend that no one has bothered to do research on the spread 
of issues at all and that, in the absence of the findings of such research, rhetoric and 
wishful thinking seems to be the rather unsatisfactory basis for stopping students 
choosing to learn what they wish to (or not learn as the case may be). 
 
The third of the above-listed tasks for the autonomy suppressor concerns the actual 
presence of the right causal chains between forced science education as means and 
good decisions as ends.  Even were none of the afore-mentioned concerns to be 
crippling, any such "good citizen making good decisions" attempted warrant would 
plausibly fail owing to two other concerns.  As noted above in another context, there 
are genuine concerns to be aired about the level of retention of whatever is gained 
from forced school science education.  What are necessary for this line of justification 
to succeed are longitudinal research studies tracking students years and decades down 
the track to see if most still retain, to any sufficient extent, whatever aspects of their 
school science are deemed to be connected conceptually and argumentatively to 
science-relevant decisions they face and have faced and will face.  I conjecture that 
the results of such research would be dispiriting for the advocates of forced science 
education (not to mention science teachers). 
 
Moreover, even if the elements relevant to some decision were still substantially in 
place in John's head as a result of Johnny's schooling, would John deploy them?  To 
do so is for John to be willing to pursue the making of an informed decision.  I 
question how much is known of citizens' serious engagement with the big science-
relevant issues of their time.  Quite possibly there is a literature more generally on 
citizens engagement or apathy and intellectual sloth concerning various civic issues 
and even if there were to be no such literature specifically connected to science-
relevant issues (as I suspect to be the case) then it might well be that those mounting 
this putative defence of forced science education could find plausibly transferable 
research findings from other such issues.  My conjecture is, though, that the results 
would be mis-pleasing.  I am perhaps overly cynical about the qualities of my fellow 
citizens but I surmise that engagement would only generally occur if the issue were to 
be a local one that impacted directly upon individuals or one that bore upon high-level 
commitments that the citizen had. 
 
To illustrate my conjecture, consider my pulp mill example from above.  I live in 
Tasmania and it is mainly one part of the north of Tasmania that would be affected 
directly one way or another by the mill's construction.  The State government will 
ultimately exercise power on the matter and, in due course, voters will exercise power 
over the State government come the next election.  So, one opportunity for them to 
make good decisions as good citizens is how they vote.  My suspicion is that it will 
only be those in the north who would have bothered to try to follow the scientific "ins 
and outs" of the debate and in so far as the government's role in the pulp mill 
controversy is a factor in the thinking of voters from elsewhere in the State (itself a 
dubious assumption) the decision will be made in relative ignorance of the scientific 
issues involved.  Why? - because it does not directly affect them. 
 
An instance of motivation to connect to an issue because of high-level beliefs and 
commitments would be the controversy concerning the history of the earth and thus 
the proper contents of the science curriculum.  Some of those engaged with the debate 
(not necessarily as vocal contributors) are engaged because of religious convictions 
concerning the interpretation and truth-status of the Bible.  Given that, they deem 
geological theory to be false.  Hopefully they would make good decisions as good 
citizens but, as the history of this particular debate attests, objectivity of appraisal of 
the science involved (even if John is intellectually capable of it) is not plausibly going 
to happen if extra-scientific yet powerful motivations exist for one stance in the 
debate being adopted.  It is by no means clear how efficacious any science education 
could26 be in the face of such a prior conviction. 
 
In summary of this point, will John retain enough of his forced school science to 
contribute usefully to decisions of a science-relevant sort that face him as a citizen?  
And, even if he did, would he bother to deploy such skill and knowledge rigorously 
enough, enough of the time, to make forcing such skill and knowledge on Johnny 
justified?  As is patently obvious, I am pessimistic here.  However it is not my 
intellectual duty to support my pessimism so much as that of the user of this "good 
citizen" putative warrant to support their optimism so that the onus can be discharged. 
 
Fourth, I reiterate that whenever empirical evidence is available, it would have to 
demonstrate, or at the least very plausibly suggest, that forced science education for 
all gives a benefit to an extent judged sufficient to outweigh attendant autonomy loss.  
So, it would have to establish that what occurs in such science education would be 
relevant to some particular range of civic decisions for some number of citizens, that 
the results of such science education would be generally retained to some identified 
extent and that such residual skills and knowledge would actually be generally 
                                                 
26 See note 11, above, Siegel, 2004 and my 2004b.  
deployed with some degree of rigour in some specified subset of civic decisions to 
which they are relevant. 
 
This is a complex "ask" of empirical researchers but something like this would have 
to be available for the onus to be discharged for we have to have a feeling for how 
much of a benefit we are likely to get as a group from forced science education before 
we can judge if it is enough of a benefit to an outweigh its cost - diminution of student 
autonomy. 
 
In summary, the upshot of all of this is that it is not at all clear that those advancing 
such a "good citizen" rationale can provide the requisite evidence that forced science 
education actually produces benefits for the group of the sort envisaged and/or to an 
extent that outweighs the loss of autonomy involved in the achievement of that 
benefit. 
 
It should also be remembered that if the goal is group benefit, then there may well be 
ways of negating student freedom that would more plausibly produce enough benefit 
to outweigh such autonomy loss.  So, even if I am wrong and forced science 
education comes out ahead on a (group benefit/loss of freedom) benefit/cost 
"equation", rival courses of action might do even better.  For instance, if what one 
wants is good citizens and if that is clarified as those that act for the increased 
happiness of the group, then we might be better off spending the time freed up by 
dropping the compulsory science curriculum for moral indoctrination of the virtue of 
benevolence. 
 






Sometimes warrants that fail individually can succeed collectively.  Although I have 
judged that none of what are sometimes aired as justifying forcing science on Johnny 
have made out a case either in terms of John's retrospective endorsement, benefit 
accruing to John and/or benefit accruing to society, perhaps a plus point here from 
such and such a rationale added to another plus point there from another rationale, 
added to... would all add up to enough of a total benefit to outweigh autonomy loss 
and thus successfully warrant forced across-the-board science education for all 
students. 
 
Perhaps.   
 
It's very hard to sensibly judge this in an empirical vacuum.  I have suggested that 
little has been done to longitudinally track the extent to which putative good 
consequences actually do obtain.  Given this, it is hard to do any such additive 
calculations where what are being added together are of unknown extent.  The best 
that can be managed is an informal guess based upon one's general knowledge of the 
world and of one's fellow citizens.  In my case, I judge matters pessimistically.  For 
me then, the onus would no more be discharged by our rationales in combination than 





The conclusion that I reach from the above is that none of the extant warrants for 
forcing science education on all students succeeds in discharging the obligations 
associated with the onus argument.  Unless either some error has occurred in my 
argumentation (perhaps concerning some impressions of mine about the paucity of 
empirical research on key matters) or some other rationale is offered that fares better, 
the current situation in schools is morally indefensible.  Science education in anything 
like its present form should cease to be compulsory and should be an option.  It is 
without aims of sufficient merit and achievability to be worth forcing on people. 
 
I have noted that I finished an earlier paper by observing that its argumentative 
strategy might have success against more targets than that of that paper.  I could make 
the same observation again (the compulsory mathematics curriculum, for instance, 
seems to me to in large part be a total waste of time).  Does this mean that I am some 
sort of mad radical enthusiast for total liberty of thought and action on the part of 
students (and older folk)?  No.  There are certainly areas of learning that I would force 
into students' (and, for that matter, deficient adults') heads with a clear conscience and 
for reasons that I consider to satisfactorily address the challenge of the onus argument.  





Bell, R., & Lederman, N. (2003). 'Understandings of the Nature of Science and 
Decision Making on Science and Technology Base Issues'. Science Education, 87, 
352-377. 
Dancy, J. (1985). Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. New York: Blackwell. 
Davson-Galle, P. (1990). History and Philosophy of Science: Mixture or Compound?'. 
In D. Herget, (Ed.), History and Philosophy of Science in Science Teaching (pp.113-
127).  Tallahassee: Florida State University. 
Davson-Galle, P. (1994). Philosophy of Science and School Science. Educational 
Philosophy and Theory, 26 (1), 34-53. 
Davson-Galle, P. (1995a). 'Advocatus Diabli or Advocatus Dei?'. Critical & Creative 
Thinking, 3 (1), 28-34. 
Davson-Galle, P. (1995b). 'Rejoinders to Cam, Cresswell & Hobson'. Critical & 
Creative Thinking, 3 (1), 41-42. 
Davson-Galle, P. (1999).  Constructivism: a Curate's Egg. Educational Philosophy 
and Theory, 31 (2), 205-219. 
Davson-Galle, P. (2002). Science, Values and Objectivity.  Science and Education, 11 
(2), 191-202. 
Davson-Galle, P. (2004a). 'Philosophy of Science, Critical Thinking and Science 
Education', Science and Education, 13 (6), 503-517.  
Davson-Galle, P. (2004b). Understanding: 'Knowledge', Belief' and 'Understanding'. 
Science and Education, 13 (6), 591-598. 
Davson-Galle, P. (2006). Why Compulsory Science Education Should Not Include 
Philosophy of Science. Science and Education (published online prior to hard copy 
issue DOI 10.1007/s11191-006-9043-9) 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/78514161m5753217/?p=a6c17c4ed08347be86c
f0c6c0cf43ca6&pi=59        
Davson-Galle, P. (forthcoming 2008). Reason and Professional Ethics.  Aldershot: 
Ashgate. 
Driver, R., Leach, J., Miller, A., & Scott, P. (1996). Young People's Images of 
Science. Bristol: Open University Press. 
Huck, S. & Sandler, H. (1979). Rival Hypotheses. New York: Harper and Row. 
Matthews, M.R. (1994).  Science Teaching.  New York: Routledge. 
Matthews, M.R. (2000). Forward and Introduction. In W.F. McComas (Ed.), The 
Nature of Science in Science Education: Rationales and Strategies (pp. xi-xix).  
Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
McComas, W.F. (Ed.) (2000).  The Nature of Science in Science Education: 
Rationales and Strategies.  Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
McComas, W., Clough, M., & Almazroa, H.(1998). The Role and Character of the 
Nature of Science in Science  Education, Science and Education 7(6), 511-532. 
Quayle, A. (2007).  Radical Constructivism and the Sin of Relativism. Science and 
Education, 16 (3-5), 231-266. 
Siegel, H. (2004). The Bearing of Philosophy of Science on Science Education, and 
Vice-versa: the case of Constructivism.  Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science35, 185-198. 
Siegel, H., & Smith, M. (2004).  Knowing, Believing and Understanding. Science and 
Education,13 (6), 553-582. 
 
